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ABSTRACT
Planning land combat operations requires a method of evaluation to determine the
strengths and weaknesses of the various possible courses of action. The principal means
of evaluating these courses of action is wargaming. Some research indicates that plan-
ning efforts lack a coherent set of wargaming rules and principles that are widely ac-
cepted and understood by military professionals. This thesis develops a theory of
combat for use by military professionals in the planning of land combat. The theory
provides a method for evaluating alternative courses of action at the brigade through
corps level that can be easily applied, The theory is based on the analysis and modeling
of categorical data from the U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency's Benchmark data.
base. The database includes 260 combined arms battles from the period 1937 through
1982, Loglinear models provide maximum likelihood estimatea of the probability of an
attack's success. The principle of falsification is explained and used to validate the the-
ory using the historical data. Applications of the theory and model to the planning of
land combat are discussed and areas for further research are outlined,
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A. THE COMMAND ESTIMATE
The process of making an estimate, or estimating the situation, has always been an
integral part of military planning. Sun Tzu, a Chinese general wrote about 500 B.C. in
The Art of War :
Now if estimates made in the temple berore hostilities indicate victory it is because
calculations show one's strength to be superior to that of his enemy; if they indicate
defeat, it is because calculations show that one is inferior. With many calculations,
one can win; with few one cannot. How much less chance of victory has one who
makes none at all! By this means I examine the situation and the outcome will be
clearly apparent. [Ref. 1: p,711
The recommended command estimate process for the development of estimates in the
United States Army is stated in Field Manual 101.3, Staff Organization and Operations,
and Command and General Staff College Student Text 100.9, The Command Estimate,
The command estimate process is outlined in Figure 1 on page 2. Alternative courses
of action are formulated during this process. These alternative courses of action must
be compared with each other using criteria set by the commander to determine which
will be adopted, These criteria may include, for example, minimizing friendly casualties
and equipment losses, adherence to certain doctrinal concepts (e,g. principles of war,
Airland Battle doctrine), or the development of an acceptable force ratio, The focus of
this thesis is to compare these courses of action based on a quantitative evaluation of
the relative probability of success of each one as estimated from the historical data,
Research in the course of action analysis process is ongoing at the Army Research
Institute (ARI) Fort Leavenworth Field Unit. The following statements characterize the
preliminary results. First, the process as outlined in ST 100.9 is not being used in ob-
served staff planning' situations (Ref. 2: p. 11. ST 100.9, The Command Estimate, is the
instructional text used to instruct -..wure general staff officers in the application of the
command estimate process, and is also intended for use as a reference by units in the
field. In a number of observed battalion and division level command post exercises only
one course of action was generated and all efforts were focused on the development of
the plan for that course of action. Notable weaknesses discussed in the published report
included the comparison of the alternative courses of action, and in particular, that there
is no recommended means of predicting battle outcomes [Ref. 3: p. 81. The few tables
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Figure 1. The Command Estimate Process
that are provided in ST 100-9 enable the user to compute a force ratio but give no esti-
mate of the chance of a successful battle outcome. The same observation is made by the
Center for Army Tactics, the author of ST 100-9, in a memorandum addressing priori.
ties for the development of automated staff planning aids (Ref, 4: pp. 24 and 37],
A possible reason for staffs not using the conmmand estimate process and in partic-
ular, the wargaming of alternative courses of action, is a lack of understanding and
confidence in the model itself. There are currently hundreds of combat models and
computer simulations that attempt to replicate combat, and we are spending millions
annually to develop improved versions of these and new models. J.A. Stockfisch sug-
gests in a 1975 RAND report that a reason for the proliferation of combat models is the
degree of ininaturity of the study of combat. Immaturity in this context refers to the
poor development of the correspondence between theory and reality [Ref. 5: p. 6].
Stockfisch notcs that physics is an example of a discipline in which the correspondence
between theory and reality is highly developed. Another analogy is particularly
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applicable to the analysis of alternative courses of action. A doctor of medicine
presumably would not use a laboratory test to diagnose a patient's condition if he did
not at least know the reliability of the test. Similarly, a mil; -v professional should nct
use a method to evaluate alternative courses of action if he does not have confidence in
it. Professional military education in the United States Army does not address a theory
of combat or combat processes other than the reading of military history for qualitative
lessons and insights.
B. HIERARCHY OF COMBAT AND SCOPE OF THIS THESIS
Before defining the scope of this thesis it is necessary to define combat and the levels
of combat that will bc addressed. Military combat is the employment of weapons by
organized forces with hostile intent for the purpose of protecting, controlling, or seizing
territory, people or resources [Ref, 6: p. 64]. This definition will be used wherever corn.
bat is discussed.
Within the o,:crall concept of combat there exists a hierarchy of levels of combat,
These levels of combat are illustrated in Figure 2 on page 4 and are adapted from
Dupuy's Understanding War--History and Theomy of Combat, Three of these levels of
combat are applicable to the theory and model of combat that will be developed here
and are further defined [Ref. 6: p. 65] below,
* Campaign: A campaign is a series of military operations coordinated in time and
space and directed toward a specified strategic objective, Campaigns are usually
composed of several battles and may last several weeks to a year.
* Battle: A battle is combat between major forces with an operational mission and
may last several days to a few weeks,
* Engagement: An engagement is combat between forces of company through divi-
sion strength and is often part of a larger battle. Engagements may last several
hours to a few days.
The data that will be used to develop the theory and validate the model consists of
campaigns, battles and engagements from the period 1937 to 1982.
There is a division of military theory that will firther narrow the scope of this thesis.
Military theory, as seen in Figure 3 on page 5 is divided into the philosophy of war and
the theory of combat. The philosophy of war deals with the political, economic and
social context of warfare and the aims of war detailed by the nation's political leadership,
The theory of combat utilizes the expertise of the professional soldier and frames the
study of military organizations, operational concepts, and military endeavors, Military
strategy, jointly formulated by the political and military leadership, is common to the
3
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Figure 2. Hierarchy of Combat
philosophy of war and the theory of combat, serving as a bridge between the two [Ref.
6: p. 65].
With regard to military expertise and professionalism the following point will be a
recurring theme throughout this thesis. Stockfisch in Models, Data and War: A Critique
of the Study of Conventional Forces, stated:
There also exists a body of knowledge relevant to military operations, which is pos-
sessed by the Officer Corps and is the product of both experience and intensive
study. This body of knowledge is often referred to as military judgment. That ex-
pressiotv is unfortunate whenever the context suggests that the kind of information
it incorporates is either inferior or superior to knowledge that is produced by appli-
cation of mrientific quantitative methodology. Particularly misleading is the idea
that knowledge produced by the application of quantitative methodology is objec-
tive, whereas military judgment is subjective. Assertions or beliefs along these lines
may not even be meaningful hypotheses that can be tested or resolved in any satis-
factory way. [Ref. 5: p. 6]
This statement further refines the requirement that the theory and model to be developed











Figure 3. Spectrum of Military Theory
outputs of the model be understandable, but also the relationships must not run counter
to military judgment,
C. THESIS GOAL AND OUTLINE
The goal of this thesis is to develop a theory for use by military professionals in
evaluating atternative courses of action for land combat operations by units at the
brigade through corps levels. The theory is intended to be understood by the user,
credible by means of historical validation, and easily applied to the planning of land
combat operations without need for computational support.
Chapter I has addressed the framework of military planning and the hierarchy of
combat. In Chapter I1 the concept of a theory of combat will be introduced and a the-
ory intended for planning purposes will be detailed. Chapter III will define the as-
sumptions, database and methodology used to analyze the historical data. Validation
of the theory from the results ol the data analysis will be discussed in Chapter IV.
Chapter V will propose applications of the theory to the planning of land combat oper-
ations. The final chapter, Chapter VI, contains concluding remarks and recommen-
dations for further study.
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II. A THEORY FOR PLANNING LAND COMBAT
A. DEVELOPMENT OF A THEORY OF COMBAT
Two sources that establish a need for the development of a theory of combat are
Huber, Low, and Taylor in Some Thoughts on Developing a Theory of Combat (1979)
(Ref,7], and TXN Dupuy's Unders.tanding War-History and Theory of Combat (1987)
[Ref.6]. Dupuy defines a theory of combat as an organization offundamental laws about
combat that explain the Interaction of combat forces and processes [Ref.6: p.79], Huber,
et,al, has the same definition and further defines a law of combat as a "confirmed hy-
pothesis" about combat [Ref,7: p.4,301, The combat processes that are the subject of the
theory of combat and the hypothesized laws of combat may include:
* Attrition:, the infliction of casualties on an opposing force
* Manuever: the movem2nt of forces to gain advantage
_ C31: command, control, communications, and intelligence functions of
commanders and their staffs
o-_. * Support: the logistical support of forces in the field
The approaches to developing a theory or combat, that is developing the hypotheses
about combat are three:
" Historical: based on the analysis of historical data from combat
* Judgmentalh based on field experiments, exercises and military judgment
* Operational analysis: based on physical or formal models
These three approches .:re complementary, and an adequate theory may combine these
approaches [Ref,7: pp.8-9], The theory developed here combines these approaches by
analyzing historical data and comparing the results with military judgment.
B. A THEORY FOR PLANNING LAND COMBAT
The following statements are the hypotheses about combat that will compose the
theory for the planning of land combat in this thesis. These hypotheses will then be
tested using the statistical methodology discussed in the next chapter.
1. Superior Combat Power Wins
The statement that superior combat power wins on the battlefield may be an
obvious one, but the measurement of combat power is a subject of considerable
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discussion. The Army's principal doctrinal manual, FM 100-3, Operations , has this to
say about combat power:
The dynamics of combat power decide the outcome of campaigns, major operations,
battles and engagements. Combat power is the ability to fight. It measures the ef-
fect created by combining manuever, firepower, protection and leadership in combat
actions against an enemy in war. [Ref.8: pll]
It is traditionally thought that a three to one superiority in combat power, measured by
some kind of force ratio, is required for an attack to succeed [Ref.91. This thesis at.
tempts to develop a statistically significant measure of combat power for use in the
planning of operations. The measures of combat power that will be considered include
the ratios of attacking to defending troops, attacking to defending artillery pieces and
attacking to defending tanks, and combinations of these three,
2. The Law of Diminishing Returns/Economy of Force
While superior combat power may win battles, at some level of combat pcower
the "marginal value or an increment of combat power is less than the marginal value of
the incremental results achieved." [Ref,7: p.1251 The hypothesis to be tested is that as
combat power is increased at a constant rate, the likelihood of an attack's success will
increase more rapidly than combat power to a certain point, after which the rate of in-
crease will be less than the rate at which %:ombat power is increased. This effect, if
present, would support the military principle of economy of force, which is *Allocate
minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts." [Ref.8: p.175]
3. Combat Multipliers: Torrain, Posture and Surprise
A combat multiplie: is a factor that increases the combat power of one side
relative to the other. This theory hypothesizes that the terrain on which the battle is
fought, the posture of the defending force, and whether or not the attacking fbrce
achieves surprise are combat multipliers.
The defender has an advantage in that he usually chooses the terrain on which
the battle will be fought,
Terrain forms the natural structure of the battlefield, Commanders must recognize
its limitations and possibilities and use it to protect friendly operations and to put
the enemy at a disadvantage, [Ref.8: p.76]
Terrain is categorized as flat, rolling or rugged in these data.
The defender's posture refers to the amount of preparation that he makes of his
position and the level of resistance that he offers the attacker.
The defender arrives in the battle area before the attacker. He must take advantage
of his early occupation of the area by making the most thorough preparations for
combat as time allows. (Ref.8: p.132]
Classifications of the defender's posture will be discussed with the database in Chapter
Surprise is a characteristic of combat that is difficult to achieve for either side
but may have decisive results.
Surprise is important at the operational and tactical levels for it can decisively affect
the outcome of battles, With surprise, success out of proportion to the effort ex.
pended may be obtained. Surprise results from going against an enemy at a time
and/or place or in a manner for which he is unprepared. It is not essential that the
enemy be taken unaware, but only that he become aware too late to react effectively.
Factors contributing to surprise include speed and alacrity, employment of unex-
pected factors, effective intelligence, deception operations of all kinds, variations of
tactics and methods of operation, and operations security. [Ref.8: p.1761
The hypotheses that surprise, posture and terrain arTect battle outcomes will be tested.
C. SUMMARY
We have defined a theory of combat as an organization of fundamental laws about
combat that explain the interaction of combat forces and processes. These laws, or
confirmed hypotheses, may be developed using analysis of historical data, experiments,
exercises and military judgment, and physical or formal models. Three hypotheses have
been proposed for inclusion into a theory of combat. They arc, first, that superior
combat power wins on the battlefield; second, that the law of diminishing returns applies
to combat power; and finally, that terrain, defender posture, and surprise have a multi.
plicative eirect on combat power. These hypotheses will be examined usinlg the meth-
odology discussed in Chapter IIl.
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Ill. METHODOLOGY
A. THE BENCHMARK DATABASE
The data used for this thesis were assembled for the U.S. Army Concepts Analysis
Agency and is contained in its research paper Historical Characteristics of Combat for
Vargames (Ben•ihmarks), written by Robert McQuie (Ref. 10]. These data, from now
on referred to is the Benchmark database, contain Information on 260 combined arms
battles from the period 1937 through 1982. Forty-five characteristics or data elements
are listed in the database for each battle, The locations, time periods and numbers of
battles in the database are listed in Table 1 on page 11. It should be noted, however,
that approximately one-fifth of the data elements in the database are empty. This is due
to the loss of records in war, inaccuracies and contradictions in historical records. For-
tunately, the missing data elements are scattered about the data in a fairly random
manner. The observations were censored if they contained a missing value for a variable
that was to be analyzed. Even with this censoring, the smallest number of battles that
were used in an analysis was 243, This means that the maximum number of censored
observations was 17, less than seven percent of the total. The reliability of the available
data has been checked, as noted in McQuie's report, with the most reliable data being
that from battles in Western Europe and Italy, and the least reliable being that from the
Korean War. The reliability of the remaining data falls between these two, (Ref.10:
pp.4-8] An extract of the data from this database is given in Appendix B, and includes
all of the data values and characteristics used in this report,
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Table 1. LOCATION OF BATTLES-BENCHMARK
DATABASE
Location Number of battles
West Europe (1940) 5
East Asia (1938-45) 6
East Europe (1939.42) 4
North Africa (1943) 8
Italy (1943-44) 64
East. Europe (1943.45) 28
West Europe (1944) 25







The iachmark database is particularly suited to the development of a theory of
combat for planning purposes, While discussing the available data about combat and
its uses, Ta~ioe stated "the available real combat data does not support verification of
detailed comn, models, but It only supports such investigations of relatively simple ag-
gregated larp.units models." [ReV.7: p.34] This purpose is consistent with the models
that are developed as a result of this research,
A number of military terms are used to characterize the battle conditions in the
Benchmark database. The most frequently used terms are given below to facilitate
understanding of the theory and model. The definitions are taken from the glossary of
the Benchmark report to Insure consistency in the interpretation of the data and models
(Ref.lO: p.B.11.
* Success. The resolution of the combat in favor of one side or the other, considering
how well each force accomplished its' mission, In some battles, neither force or
both forces have been successful,
• Surprise. Surprise occurs when one force is able to confront its opponent with
tactical circumstances that the opponent did not anticipate or adequately prepare
II
for. Surprise may be achieved with respect to time, location, manuever or
firepower.
Terrain. The total topography of the battlefield as described in the sources; cate-
gorized as rough, rolling or flat.
The defender's posture has five different categorizations that are defined as follows:
e Delay. A retrograde movement in which the defender slows down and damages an
advancing enemy to gain time, but does not beome decisively engaged in combat
or allow himself to be outflanked.
a Fortified defense. A coordinated defense system prepared with sufficient time and
material to complete planned entrenchments, field fortifications, and obstacles.
0 Hasty defense. A defense normally organized while in contact with the enemy or
when contact is imminent and time for battle preparation is limited. It involves the
use of foxholes, emplacements and obstacles. With enough time, usually taken to
be one day, a hasty defensive position can be improved to a prepared or fortified
defense.
* Prepared defense. A defense prepared with time, often considered to be one day,
to improve the position, but which due to lack of time and material has less than
the strength of a fortified postion.
* Withdrawh. A movement in accordance with the will of a force's commander away
from the enemy that terminates combat or contact with the enemy force,
Force ratios are traditional measures of combat power, These ratios are often used to
estimate "how much is enough" in the preparation of courses of action and In making
tactical decisions. The three most commonly used force ratios are attacking to defending
troops, attacking to defending artillery pieces, and attacking to delending tanks,
Firepower Indices are sometimes used as measures of combat power, Each weapon
system is assigned a firepower score, a value relative to the other weapons systems con-
sidered, For example, a soldier may be equal to a score of one, an artillery piece equiv-
alent to a score of 65, and a tank may be i00. These scores are multiplied by the number
of their respective systems on a side and summed to give a firepower index for that side,
The attacking to defending indices are then formed into a ratio to evaluate the relative
strength of each side,
B. DATA PREPARATION
To simplify the modeling of the response variable, success, any battle that was
classified as a draw or victory for both sides was recoded as a defender success, Because
there were relatively few battles that were categorized as draws or decisions for both
sides, this simplification had very little effect on the overall analysis.
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"The majority of the data contained in the Benchmark database is categorical in na-
ture, meaning that the data type consists of ordered or unordered classifications of the
data. For instance, temperature on the battlefield is classified as hot, mild or cold (an
ordered classification); defender posture is classified as hasty defense, prepared defense,
fortified defense, delay or withdrawl (an unordered classification). In addition to the
categorical data, numeric data is given for each side regarding the numbers of troops and
weapons systems employed as well as casualties and equipment losses as a result of the
battle, These numeric data were computed and then recoded into a categorical classi.
fication that coud be analyzed in a contingency table and used in loglinear modeling.
The classificatios for all ratio scale data are listed in Table 2,













At this point it is appropriate to discuss why the force ratios were categorized in this
manner when procedures for logistic regression exist. One alternative approach would
be to use logistic regression with ordinal categorized variables recoded to a number code.
Unordered categorical data, such as defender posture, would be recoded using several
durnmy variables, This was attempted using the same procedures described below for
categorical modeling, but the likelihood ratio statistic used to assess model goodness
of fit showed a very poor model fit to the data This may be because the variables are
not linear in the logit function. Rather than finding a non.linear relationship, the ratios
were categorized in a sensible manner to develop an easily understood model, The
13
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recoding of the ratios into categories and the use of all categorical data in the model
produced satisfactory results.
The assumption was made that the method of categorization of numeric variables
did not significantly affect the modeling result. This assumption was tested by the use
of several scalings. Scalings that were more coarse did not produce statistically signif-
icant models, and finer scalings produced significant models but reduced cell size to the
point where the models became unusable. The current scaling balances these consider-
ations.
C. CATEGORICAL MODELING
Loglinear models of the categorical data were used to analyze the data. These
models attempt to describe the interaction between or among variables in multidimen.
sional contingency tables based on cross-product ratios of expected cell values. The
contingency table describes the structural relationship among the variables that compose
the dimensions of the table. If N is the total number of battles in the contingency table,
x,, is the total number of observations in the ith row, and x., is the total number in the
jth column, then under the assumption of independence between the row and column
categories, At , the maximum likelihood estimator of expected value of the U cell, is
A _V,+x+j
n - N
Taking the logarithms of both sides,
log Au- log xj+ + log x+j - log N.
Thus log n't. is linear in the log of the marginal totals. Under independence, log m,, is
modeled as
logm=v + *I + fl+
where
S- overall mean effect
c - mean effectfor variable I
fli - mean effectfir variablej.
In the fully saturated loglinear model
14
llogmf = MV + a, +. + OC#U
where al is the interaction term, For the models used in this research, the response
variable was always success, defined as whether or not the attack succeeded.
Let A f M the ith attack was a success -
10 if the Ith attack was not a success
The explanatory variables included the categorized ratio of attacking to defending tanks,
troops, and artillery (each with ten levels), the defender's posture (five levels), the terrain
(three levels), and whether or not the attacker gained surprise (two levels). Because there
are thirty thousand cells in the fully saturated model and only 260 battles, the approach
used was to search for significant subset models. Suppose we were to model success as
a response to defender posture and surprise. Posture represents the rows and surprise
represents the columns of the model's associated contingency table, The expected value
for the number of successes in the ith row and jth column without interaction between
posture and surprise can be denoted m. , where
logm l-y + %I + 0)
where
A - overall mean effect
*I - mean effect for posture i
lib - mean efAect for surprisej,
The CATMOD procedure of the SAS statistical analysis package was used as the tool
for the categorical data modeling., This procedure uses maximum likelihood to estimate
parameters for loglinear models Refl'. 1: p.1741, The parameters ja , i, and fl, are esti.
mated using an iterative method to maximize the likelihood function, The emphasis of
the procedure is on model building, goodness of fit testing, and the estimation of cell
frequencies and probabilities of the underlying contingency tables, The procedure's
output includes profiles of the data, actual and predicted cell probabilities, analysis of
parameters and effects, and the likelihood ratio statistic for assessing goodness of fit.
The following table illustrates an application of the test statistics output by the
CATMOD procedure to the modeling results. One model hypothesized that defender
posture and surprise could predict attack success. As seen in Table 3 on page 16 the
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p-value for the explanatory variable posture, which tests to see if the explanatory vari-
able posture has an effect on success in the presence of the explanatory variablc surprise,
is 0.03. Thus, at a reasonable level of significance (less than 0.03), the null hypothesis
that posture has no effect would be rejected.
Table 3. MODEL RESULT FOR LOGLINEAR MODEL SUCCESS - POS-
TURE SURPRISE
Res varile Explanatory vari- P value of exv P value of Ilkeli-sponse a ables planatflvs hood statistic
_______________ables
Attack success Defender posture 0.03 0.95
__ ..... _ _Surprise 0.60
On the other hand, surprise has a 0.60 p-value, so that it is unlikely in the presence of
the explanatory variable posture that surprise is a significant factor for predicting suc.
cess. The p-value for the likelihood ratio statistic for the model is 0.95, meaning that the
similarity between the observed battle outcomes and those predicted by the model is very
high. Overall, this is not a bad model but there may be other combinations of explana-
tory variables with posture that may produce good models of battle outcomes. The re-
sults of this type of modeling will be discussed in the next chapter.
D. PLOTTING AND ANALYSIS OF OUTPUT
Predicted cell probabilities using the maximum likelihood estimates were input into
GRAFSTAT, a statistics and graphics package on the IBM mainframe system. These
cell probabilities were plotted for models that were found to be statistically significant
using the tests previously discussed. The cell probabilities are an estimate of the prob.
ability of an attack's success given the conditions that define that cell in the model. The
plots of the cell probabilities were smoothed using LOWESS, a locally weighted re-
gression scatter plot smoothing method which employs weighted least squares to fit a
line to a set of points on a scatter plot [Ref',12: p.94], An example plot is given as
Figure 4 on page 17, where the traditional force ratios and the maximum likelihood
estimates of the attack probability of success are plotted. This plot is based on all of the
observations in the Benchmark database. These plots were then compared with the
hypotheses in the theory of combat, with historical data, and military judgment to
determine lessons and insights which may be helpful for the planning of land combat,
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Figure 4. Traditional Measures of Combat Power
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E. SUMMARY
In this chapter the methodology for the developmcnt of hypothescs about combat
based on historical data and military judgment was discussed. The Benchmark data base
was introduced as well as the modeling assumptions used. The analysis of categorical
data with the use of loglinear models and appropriate test statistics was also discussed.
In the next chapter the validation of the theory and results of the analysis will be dis.
cussed in detail.
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IV. VALIDATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE THEORY AND MODELS
A. THE PRINCIPLE OF FALSIFICATION
In the previous chapter the methodology and data used to model battle outcomes
were discussed. This chapter begins with a discussion of a principle for model validation,
and then describes in detail the research conducted and results observed, Validation in
this context means the determination of whether or not the results output by a model
are a faithful representation of the actual system being modeled.
An approach to validation is to validate the underlying theory on which the model
is based. In the case of this research, the theory to be validated consists of a set of hy-
potheses about combat and combat processes. The method of falsification as developed
by Huber states that a deductively derived hypothesis about combat may be considered
usable as long as historical research does not provide statistically significant evidence for
its rejection, These "negative falsifications" of combat hypotheses, while not the rigor-
ously controlled experiments of the physical sciences, may nevertheless be considered to
approach validation and allow the incorporation of the hypotheses into the theory
[Ref.7: p.25].
Since all of the hypotheses about combat will be tested for statistical significance
using the actual data about combat, those that are statisticuflly significant will be con-
sidered validated for the purposes of this theory of combat. These hypotheses will also
need to be in agreement with military judgmtnt so that the theory and modeling results
are transparent to the intended user, the military planner.
B. OVERVIEW OF MODELS USED AND RESULTS
The number of models tried in the modeling effort was large, The following table
displays some of the models developed and the wide range of significance levels ob-
served. The statistical significance level given, a, is the maximum of the individual p.
values for the model's explanatory variables. The models are arranged roughly in order
of relatively best fit to worst.
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Table 4, SUMMARY OF MODELING RESULTS
Response Variable: Attack Success
P value of Overall a
Explanatory Variables likelihood level
statistic
Attacker, Posture, Surprise 0.89 0.04
Tank ratio, Posture, Surprise 0.62 0.14
Tank ratio, Posture 0.50 0r15
Tank ratio, Surprise 0.47 0.25
A~tt~acker, Posture ,0.40 0.06,
Artillery ratio, Posture 0.35 0.83
Attacker, Defender 0.30 0,01
Tank ratio, Terrain 0.14 0.42
Troop ratio, Posture 0.09 0.87
Tank, Artillery, and Troop ratios 0.001 0.86
Again, the higher the p-value for the likelihood statistic, the more consistent the
model is with the data. While the a level for most models is relatively high, it must be
remembered that the data being modeled does not come from a rigorously controlled
exper'iment, but from actual battles distributed over a period of forty-five years, Because
combat is as much a social phenomenon as a physical one, there are many uncontrolled
factors such as leadersbhp, morale, training and doctrine, An effort was made to see if
the differences in fighting capabilities between different national forces could be quanti-
fitd. This effort was unsuccessful in finding a measure of the fighting capabilities of
differinb national forces, but the models that include the attacking and or dellnding
forces are highly significant, probably due to the fact that the identification of the na-
tional forces captures some of the uncontrolled factors. The tabled probabilities of
success by national force end posture in Appundix A may provide some insights into the
fighting capabilities of the forces of specific nations.
A considerable amount of time was spent attempting to use firepower indices to
quantify combat power and predict battle outcomes using categorical modeling. While
highly significant scalings of firepower scores were developed, these scalings produced
unsatisfactory results when combined with other explanatory variables (defender pos-
ture, surprise) to model battle outcomes. It is suggested that the subjective scaling used
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in firepower score methods does not capture the synergistic effects of combined arms
forces. Additionally, it is not clear whether or not the relative firepower score of a Sys-
tem would remain constant during the time period of the data, 1937 through 1982.
A modified version of the Quantified Judgment Model suggested by Dupuy in his
analysis of the 1982 Bekka Valley campaign [Ref.7: pp.237-250] was tried on the data set.
* This ipproach used essentially a firepower score approach with multiplicative factors for
terrain, posture and surprise included in the firepower index of each side, This model
did not produce statistically significant results in the modeling of battle outcomes.
C. RESULTS SPECIFIC TO THE THEORY OF COMBAT
1. Superior Combat Power Wins
One of the principal findings of the modeling was that the force ratios of at-
tacking to deranding troops ard a.ttacking tn defending artillcry pieces were not statis.
tically signifIcant. in predicting battle outcomes, The mnore interesting result, however,
was that the ratio of attacking to defending tanks was significant at the 0.05 level in
predicting successfuil attacks. This may not be surprising considering that;
In mounted warfare, the tank is the primary offensive weapon, Its firepower, pro-
%action from enemy rite, and speed create the shock affect necessary to disrupt the
enemy's operations and to deeat him, rRef.8: p.42]
* This is, not to say, howuver, that tanks ame the only weapons required to conduct a suc-
cessfUl attack. The principle of combined arms, that is an apprupriato mix of irnfantry,
armor, and* artillery, sup~ported by -n~ginecis, aviation and air defense Is nioccssary for
success. The tank~ r~.tio, however, seenis to be the baromeier of whether or not an ap-
pror~riately balanced force hvG enough combat power to successibiy conduct an attack.
As seen in Figure 4 on page 17 the probability of a sticcess~il attackh increases by fifty
percent as the tan~k ratio increases from less thaii 1:1 to 5:1. An effect attributed to se-
ven' Arab.lsraeii war campagnis and further discussed in the analysis of post.ure as a
v;orbai inuitiplier may explain wh> the slighi peak exist~s in the area of the 1: 1 tank ratio.
As a rewuit of these find~ings, thvý measure of ccrnbat power to be iised in subsequent
nmodels will be &tl ratio of aLtarlLiug to defending tanks.
An attempt was made to distinguish a historical trend in the tank ratio's ability
to predict battle oul.vome6. The data points were di'.idtd into f')ur periods of approxi-
* ~niaaly equal numbers, :ncludhig 1937 through 1943, 1944 Europe, !944 through 1953
Asia and the Pacific, and 1954 through 19,1. No trends in the tank ratio's ubility to
predict battle outcomes were evident between the four periods, as none of the models
produced significant results when tested against a subset of the data.
2. The Law of Diminishing Returns/Economy of Force
The law of diminishing returns would imply that marginal increases in combat
power would have a diminishing effect on the marginal increase in probability of success
as the tank ratio increases. This effect can be seen in the plot of the tank ratio in
Figure 4 on pag,, 17 as well as all of the figures in this chapter, The slope of the prob-
abillty curve begins to decrease at about the 3:1 tank ratio, implying that the point where
marginal cost equals marginal returns is in the vicinity of that point. While the effect
of the law of diminishing returns is not statistically proven by it.;elf, the effects are evi-
dent in the plots of statistically significant models. The land area over which forces are
concentrated may influence this effect, and fuirther research on this hypothesis is sug-
gested in Chapter VI,
3. Combat Multiplier: Terrain
The modeling of terrain by itself and combined with other factors did not have
a statistically snjnl!lcant effect on battle outcomes. The model results are shown in Ta-
ble 5 and plotted in Figure 5 on page 23,
Table 5. MODEL RESULT FOR LOGLINEAR MODEL SUCCESS - TANK
RATIO TERRAIN . ...
Explanatory vari- P value of ex- P value of likeli-
Response variable ables planatory vari- hood statistic
ae ables
Tank ratio 0.08
Attack success Terrain 0.42 0.14
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Figure 5. Terrain and Tank Ratio versus Success
The plot does show, however, that there is some effect due to terrain. While terrain is
certainly significant from the perspective of military judgment, there may be a reason for
its lack of statistical significance in a model. The models are based on data from battles
that actually occurred. In most of these instances the attacker probably had the option
not to attack if he felt that the terrain was to his disadvantage and he did not have other
means of gaining an advantage. It is interesting to note that the combination of terrain
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and posture did not produce a statistically significant model, As a result of these
findings, the hypothesis that terrain is a combat multiplier is not included in the theory
of combat.
4. Combat Multiplier: Posture
The defender's posture was found to be highly significant in predicting battle
outcomes, both by itself and in combination with certain other explanatory variables,
particularly the tank ratio and surprise, The model results are shown for the combina-
tion of the tank ratio and posture in Table 6 and plotted in Figure 6 on page 25. A
highly useful three factor model combining posture, the tank ratio and surprise will be
used in the application example in Chapter V.
Table 6. MODEL RESULT FOR LOGLINEAR MODEL SUCCESS - TANK
RATIO POSTUREResponse variable Epatoyre- P value of ex- "
Explanatory var- planatory vae. P value of likeli.ables abies hood statistic
Attack success Tank ratio 0.09 0.50Attack__sucess Defender posture 0.15 0.50
The observed data about posture, summarized in Table 7 on page 26 lends additional
support to the plotted model. The one surprising result from a military perspective is
that the probability of success against a hasty defense is lower than the probability of
success against a prepared defense at any force ratio, Hasty defenses are characterized
by a lower level of preparation (less than 24 hours) than prepared defenses, The key to
understanding this phenomenon may lie in realizing that deliberate attacks are normally
conducted against prepared and fortified postions because of their strength and time is
made available for pre-attack preparations, Hasty attacks are usually conducted against
hasty defenses due to the need to exploit a situation or when a decision is sought before
reinforcements can arrive. In these situations it is possible that the defender can use the
strength of the defense as a form of combat to reduce the attacker's cnances of success,
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Figure 6. Defender Posture and Tank Ratio versus Success
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*Hasty Defense 0.52 60
Prepared 0.75 75
A careful observer will note that in Figure 6 on page 25 the probability of suc.
cess against prepared defenses at about a H1 tank ratio does not follow the slope of the
other curves, This may be attributed to about twelve data points in that region repres-
* enting attacks In various campaigns or' the Arab-Israeli conflicts, The recognized
profescionalisrn of the Israeli armored corps probably contributed to their success in
attacking prepared positions at that force ratio; however, two or the battles were
Egyptian successes during the initial crossing of the Suez Canal at the start of the 1973
* way,
S. Combat Multiplier: Surprise
Surprise by itself was not found to be significant in determi~ning battle outcomes,
but contributed to models that included the tank ratio and posture,
Table 8. MODEL RESULT FOR LOGLINEAR MODEL SUCCESS - TANK
RATIO SURPRISE_______ _______
Repos vrabe Explanatory vari- P value of ex- Phaleood staistic
Resone vribleabesplanatory vanl- Poo v talutoiketi-ables ~~able$ _________
Attack success Tank ratio 0.02 0.47
___________1_ Surprise 0.25
Table 9 on page 28 indicates that historically a five to twelve percent increase in the
probability of a successful attack can be gained by attaining some form of surprise, and
reinforces the modeling result depicted in Figure 7 on page 27,
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Figure 7. Attacker Surprise and Tank Ratio versus Succems
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Table 9. OBSERVED PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS BY POSTURE AND SUR-
PRISE
Number of
Posture Surprise P[success] observa-
tions
Fortified Defense Atkr 0.77 13
Fortified Defense No 0.72 84
Hasiy Defense Atkr 0.58 12
Hasty Defense No 0.52 46
Prepared Defense Atkr 0.78 9
Prepared Defense No 0,74 66
The manner in which surprise was achieved was not specified in the database, but the
possibilities include surprise in the time of the attack, its location, the forces and tactics
used, or the employment of a new technology.
D. SUMMARY
The method of falsification developed by Huber was explained as the means for the
validation of the theory of combat. In short, deductively derived hypotheses about
combat may be considered usable as long as historical research does not provide statis-
tically significant evidence for their rejection, Each of the hypotheses was then modeled
using the loglinear modeling of categorical data and the results were analyzed.
The traditional force ratios of attacking to defending troops and attacking to de-
fending artillery pieces were not statistically significant in predicting battle outcomes,
while the ratio of attacking to defending tanks was significant at the 0,05 level in pre-
dicting successful attacks. This suggests that the tank ratio is a statistically significant
measure of combat power, The effect of the law of dirminishing returns was seen in
models that included the tank ratio as one o C the explanatory variables. Terrain is not
considered a combat multiplier for purposes of this theory of combat as it was shown
to be not statistically significant. Surprise iF, a combat multiplicr when considered with
the tank ratio, while the defender's posture ýs the most significant of the combat multi.
pliers. In Chapter V, a practical application of these results will be discussed.
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V. APPLICATION TO THE PLANNING OF LAND COMBAT
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will Illustrate an application of the theory of combat developed up to
this point to the planning of a land combat operation in a contingency theater of oper-
ations, This application will use a three factor model which integrates the tank ratio,
defender posture, and surprise as the variables predicting attack success,
Table 10. MODEL RESULT FOR LOGLINEAR MODEL SUCCESS - TANK
RATIO POSTURE SURPRISE
Explanatory ar- value o P value of likell.
Response variable ables planatory vari- hood statisticables
Tank ratio 0.03
Attack success Def•nder posture 0.14 0.62
Surp rIse 0.13 _ _ _
This model Is highly significant relative to all of the models developed by this analysis
and Is the best of the three factor models. The model results are plotted in Figure II
on page 35 and Figure 12 on page 36, Thi standard errors of the probability estimates
rangle from 0,05 to 0.20, The regions defined by a one standard error distance from the
plotted lines overlap adjacent regions through the range of the tank ratio, The regions
overlap the estimated probabilities for adjacent levels of posture most notably in the
artas of the 1.0 to 1,5 and the 4,0 to 4.5 tank ratios, which are also the regions where
th,.- slopes of the probability estimates change most rapidly,
B. A SCENARIO FOR DEMONSTRATION
The following scenario is used to demonstrate the potential of the theory of combat
in examining two courses of action,
Situation. Sirocco, a country allied with the United States in pro-
moting regional interests has been invaded by a neighboring country,
Ekron, intent on seizing disputed territory. U.S. firces have been de-
ployed to assist in reo)elling the attack of the belligerent neighbor.
The neighboring country is well-armed with modern main battle tanks,
armored personnel carriers, self-propelled artillory end aviation sup-
port. Siroccan forces are no longer capable of offensive action due to
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the surprise nature of the attack and an extraordinary effort to contain
the enemy advance. Forces available to the U.S. III Corps commander are
limited due to naval and air actions off the coast of Sirocco by another
unfriendly power. The enemy forces that have crossed the intornational
boundary are preparing defensive positions in the hope that a cease fire
agreement will be negotiated, allowing them to annex the territory gained.
The enemy forces in Sirocco are listed in Table 11, and do not include
the sizeable reserve force located in Ekron. The U.S. ground forces
available are listed in Table 12 on page 31, and the current dispositions
of all forces are shown in Figure 8 on page 32.
Mission. The U. S. III Corps commander has been given the mission to
attack and terminate the conflict on terms favorable to the U.S. and our
Siroccan allies. The mission must be accomplished within the next 48
hours and with the forces currently on hand.
Courses of Action. The III Corps plans officer has developed two
courses of action for analysis. The first, designated as Course of Action
A, is represented in Figure 9 on page 33, and is an attack on two axes
by armored briSade- to destroy the enemy forces in sector. The western
axis, designated as the main attack, is reinforced by the Corp's mech-
anized infantry brigade. One armored cavalry squadron will block movement
by the 211 Infantry Regiment along the Portola-Webster highway, while the
other cavalry squadron will follow the attack and block the other highway
crossing the Ekron-Sirocco international boundary. Course of Action B,
depicted in Figure 10 nn page 34, is an attack on one axis with two
armored brigades abreast to penetrate the enemy's defenses and secure
positions cutting off his lines of communication. One of the cavalry
squadrons secures the Webster-Portola highway, while the other blocks any
advances toward Portola by the cut off enemy forces.
Table 11. ENEMY FORCES DEPLOYED IN SIROCCO
Unit Symbol Number of
tanks
111 and 121 Armored 70 each
Regiments, 2 TD min
131 and 211 Mechanized 30 each
Reg•ments, 2 TD 1_ _ 1
'2 Tank Division Artillery None
Regiment No....
30
Table 12. U.S. FORCES AVAILABLE FOR EMPLOYMENT
Unit Symbol Number of
tanks
Ist and 3d Brigades, 2d[=.] 100 each
• " Armored Division
2d Brigade (Mech), 2d so
Armored Division aD
Division Artillery, 2d None
Armored Division aim-
1st and 2d Squadrons, 3d i 40 each
Armored Cavalry Regi-
ment - .
C. APPLICATION OF THE THEORY
In order to analyze each course of action the plans officer must first establish what
information is available and what assumptions will be made. H-e will use available in.
telligence information to estimate the enemy strength, the level of preparation of the
enemy's defensive positions, and whether or not it is likely that some form of surprise
will be achieved. This information is combined with the size of the attacking force on
each axis of attack to estimate the force ratio. This is done for each course of action in
succession. We can then use the modeling results in Figure 11 and Figure 12 to estimate
the attack's probability of success based on the tank ratio, the defender's posture, and
whether surprise is likely to be achieved.
In Course of Action A, the main attack, designated by the double arrow in Figure
9, has a ratio of attacking to defending tanks of approximately 1.5:1. If we identify the
enemy's posture as prepared, and assess that surprise is unlikely, the attack's probability
of success from Figure 12 is about 0.5 ± 0.1. The supporting attack by the 3d Brigade
and a cavalry squadron has a 2:1 tank ratio, and under the same posture and surprise
assumptions also has a probability of success of about 0,5 ± 0.1., Ia means of achieving
surprise were available, such as a night movement and a deception operation in the
northern sector, Figure II would show the probabilities of success of the main and
supporting attacks to be about 0,77 ± 0,1 and 0.82 ± 0.1 respectively, Differing as-
sumptions about the defender posture would be handled in the same manner by refer.




Figure 8, Operational Situation ,
Course of Action B, illustrated in Figure 10, concentrates the available forces against
one enemy regiment, achieving a tank ratio of 3,5:1. If surprise is possible and if the
enemy's posture is prepared, the probability of success from Figure 11 is 0.9 + 0.05. The
probability of success from Figure 12 is 0.7 ± 0.15 if surprise is unlikely to be attained.
We also note from the plot that the point of diminishing marginal returns is reached at
about the 3,5:1 ratio for this level of defender posture. To the planner this would imply
S~that if additional forces were avail ble '.hey would be more effectively used in etforts that
• were not at the point of diminishing returns. The planner would now have the estimate~d
probabilities of success based on historical experience to consider along with other fac-
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Figure 9. Course of Action A
considerations wc'e equal, the planner should choose course of action B, the plan with
the greatest probubililty of success.
The laws of probability can be used to extend the usefulness of the model used in
this chapter, For instance, the joint probability of success of two simultaneous attacks
is the product of the two probabilities, if the opexations are independent of each other.
The probability of a successfu! defense is one minus the probability of a successful at-
tark. If defcnsive operations are being planned, the tank ratio used in the model is still
the ratio of attacking t- defendixvg tanks. In this case the defensive planner must esti-
mate the number of enemy tanks in the formation that will oppose him and whether the
attackex can achieve surprise as to the time and place of the attack. A conservative
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Figure 11. Tank Ratio and Posture versus Success (Surprise Possible)
probability of succ~ess of offensive operations, and its use for iovaluating defensive
courses of' action was also explained. While this model cannot be used al one to evaluate
operational plans, it provides a quantitative nicans tu supplomtnt ndliitary judgrnent.
The next chapter concludes with a sumnmary of the research findings and recomnmen-
dations for further study,
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Figure 12. Ta: ,k Ratio and Posture versus Success (Surprise Unlikely)
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
A. THE THEORY AND MODEL FOR THE PLANNING OF LAND COMBAT
The focus of this thesis was a method of comparing alternative courses of action
based on a quantitative evaluation of the estimated probability of success of each. The
scope was the planning of land combat at the brigade through corps levels, A theory
of combat was used to organize fundamental laws about combat and explain the inter.
action of combat forces and processes. These laws of combat were hypotheses con-
firmed by historical data, military judgment and formal models.
The method of falsification developed by Huber was explained as the means for the
validation of the theory of combat. In short, deductively derived hypotheses about
combat may be considered usable as long as historical research does not provide statis-
tically significant evidence for their rejection. Each of the hypotheses was then modeled
using the loglinear modeling of categorical data and the results were analyzed. The data
characterized 260 combined arms battles that occurred during the period 1937 through
1982,
The traditional force ratios of attacking to defending troops and attacking to de.
fending artillery pieces were not statistically significant in predicting battle outcomes,
while the ratio of attacking to defending tanks was significant at the 0.05 level in pre-
dicting successful attacks. This suggests that the tank ratio is a statistically significant
measure of combat power. The effect of the law of diminishing returns was seen In
graphs of attack success probabilities that included the tank ratio as one of the explan-
atory variables. Terrain is not considered a combat multiplier for purposes of this theory
of combat as it was not shown to be statistically significant. Surprise is a combat mul-
tiplier when considered with the tank ratio, while the defender's posture is the most sig-
nificant of the combat multipliers, In Chapter V, a practical application of these laws
of combat was illustrated,
B. IMMEDIATE APPLICATIONS TO MILITARY PLANNING
The theory and models addressed in this research could be incorporated into current
doctrinal and instructional manuals as a means of modeling combat power and assessing
courses of action. These manuals and courses of instruction could include the Command
and General Staff College's ST 100-9 The Command Estimate and ST 100-3 Battle
Book, as well as instruction in brigade level operations conducted at the Army's combat
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arms schools, Additionally, the tables containing observed data and probabilities of
success in Chapter IV and Appendix A give some insights into the effects of posture,
surprise, and attacker-defender combinations on combat outcomes, These tables and
the plots of modeling results can also be used as a "benchmark" to compare highly ag-
gregated combat models with historical combat,
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
The methodology developed in Chapter III could be used to further analyze the
Benchmark database. The categorical modeling of battle outcomes (eg. penetration,
withdrawl, breakthru) using explanatory variables including tactics and posture could
validate additional hypotheses to be included in the theory of combat developed in this
thesis, The data may also be analyzed to validate current tables of advance rates, casu-
alty rates, and equipment loss rates or to develop new tables. In addition, some testing
could be done to determine if these types of loss and advance rates can be reliably
modeled, One further area of interest would be the examination of the effect of attacker
and defender frontage and defensive position depth on battle outcome, This study iidght
reveal more about the effects of economy of force and diminishing returns on combat
power and battle outcomes,
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APPENDIX A. PROBABILITIES OF SUCCESS BY NATIONAL FORCE
AND POSTURE
These tables display the observed probabilities of successful attacks by various
combinations of attacking and defending forces and defender posture. Posture was
found to be highly significant In predicti. battle outcome when combined with data
about the national Corce attacking or de-tnding. Cells that contain dashed entries had
fewer than five observations in them an'd are not displayed to avoid misinterpretation.
Table 13, OBSERVED PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS BY ATTACKING FORCE
AND POSTURE
__..... ______ Defender Posture ......
Attacker Fortified Prepared Hasty De- Delay
Defense Defense fense
Briti.qh 0.58 0.75 0.80 .
Egyptian -_- _ 0.33 -
German •_0.54 0.17 .
Israeli 0.77 0.83 0181
U.S. 0.59 0.89 0.78 0.86
U.S.S.R. 0.78 0.90 -_.
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Table 14. OBSERVED PROBABILITY OF SUCCE3S BY DEFENDING FORCE
AND POSTURE
Defender Posture
Defender Fortified Prepared Hasty Do- Delay
Defense Defense fense
British ._0.14 0.20 .
Egyptian 0.80 0.89 0.70 .
German 0.58 0,84 0.75 0.80
Israeli 0.43 020
Japanese 0.64 -
Syrian 0.74 0.99 -
U.S. - 0-09 T
U.S.S.R. 0.60 _ __I__

















APPENDIX B. EXTRACT FROM BENCHMARK DATABASE




2 Spain "uadoLaeare Ztel SRpb Army Army FlPt Bore
3
4 Frano Ardennes Gar Pr ArOp Army Rolling Mixed
5 France Sedan ar FPr Corp Army Rolling Mixed
6 France Csmbral Oar Pr Div Div Rolling Mixed
7 Friane Arras Brit Gar Rot Rut Rolling Mixed
8 Frano am$s Pr gar Co Co Rolling Mixed
9
10 Manchuria Chmngkufsng I Jap USSR Rgt Rot Rugged Bare
11 Manchuria Changkufeng 2 USSR Jap Div Div Rugged Bare
12 Manchuria Changkufeng 3 USSR Jap Army Div Rugged Bare
13 Manohuria Nomonhan I Jap USSR Rot Rot Rolling Bare
14 ManohurLia Homomhan 2 USSR Jap Army Army Rolling Bare
11 Manchuria MutonIkiatg USSR Jip Army Corp Rugged Mixed
16
17 Malaysia Jitra Brit Jap Div Div Rolling Hooded
16
19 Finland Suomussalmi Finn USSR Div Corp Rolling Hooded
20 Russia Rovno Gar USSR Army Arip Rolling Mixed
21 Russia Moscow Defense car USSR ArOp Areip Rolling Mixed
22 Russia Moscow Counterattaok USSR Gar ArOp Artp Rolling Mixed
23 Russia Pogoreloye USSR Gar Army Army FlPt Swamp
* 24
25 NAfrica Alam Halfft gar+ Brit Army Army Flat Bare
26 N.Africa Alamein 2 Brit Gar+ Army Army Flat Bare
27 N.Africa Alamoin-Lightfoot Brit GBa+ Army Army Flat Bare
28 N.Afri-a Alamein.Bridgahead Brit Ger+ Army Army Flat Bare
29 N.Africs Alamain-Superoharge Brit Gar+ Army Army Flat Bare
30 N.Afrios Choulgul Pass Ger US B.n Co Rolling Bare
31 N.Afrioa El Guettar 3 Oar US Div Div Rolling Bare
32 N.Africa Saedjarvi-Bizarte US oar Div Div Rugged Mixed
13
54 Italy Amphitheater Brit Bar Div Rot Rolling Mixed
35 Italy Port of Salerno Brit car Div Rgt Rolling Mixed
56 Italy Sele-Colors Corridor US Gar Div Div Rolling Mixed
37 Italy Battipaglia I GOP Brit Div Div Rolling Mixed
38 Italy Vietrt I gar Brit Div Div Rolling Mixed
39 Italy Tobacco Faotory car Brit Div Div Rolling Mixed
40 Italy BSttipgolia 2 Brit Bar Div Rot Rolling Mixed
41 Italy Eboli US Bar Div Div Rolling Mixed
42 Italy Vietri 2 Bar Brit Div Div Rolling Mixed
45 Italy (Grazzanise Bilt Ger Div Div Flat Mixed
44 Italy Coiezzo US Bar Div Div Rolling Mixed
45 Italy Capus Brit Gar Div Div Flat Mixed
46 Italy Castel Volturno Brit Gar Div Div Flat Mixed
47 Italy Monte Acero Us Gar Div Div Rugged Mixed
41
44 Italy Trifliseo US W6,' Div Div Rolling Mixed
49 Italy Drsgoni US Go't• Div Div Rolling Mixed
50 Italy Canal I splt Oar Div Div Flat Mixed
51 Italy HMnte Grande iV) Srlt Gr Rgt Rgt Rolling. Mixed
5t Italy Canal 2 Brit Gar Div Rgt Rolling Mixed
53 Italy Fronooliie Slit Bar Div Rot Rolling Mixed
54 Italy S. Maria Olivato US Oar Div Div Rolling Mixed
55 Italy Monte Camino I Brit Oar Div Rgt Rugged Mixed
56 Italy Monte L~gg US oar Div RNt Rugged Mixed
57 Italy Ponwilli US Gar Div Div Rugged mixd
an Italy Monte Camino I Oar Brit Rgt Rut Rugged Mixed
"59 Italy Monte Rotondo US oar Oi v Rgt Rugged Mixed
60 Italy Calabritto Brit Oar Div Div Rugged Mixed
61 Italy Monte Camino I Brit Oar Div Rgt Rugged Mixed
61 Italy Monte Maggiere US Oar Div Rot Flat Mixed
63 Italy Aprille I Brit Gar Div Div Flat Mixed
64 Italy Feotory I Wwr Brit Div Div Rolling Mixed
65 Italy Cempoleone a Car B rit Div Rgt Flat Mixed
66 Italy Campoloone I Brit oar Div Div Flat Mixed
67 Italy Carrocoto Oar Brit Div Div Flat Mixed
6i Italy Molatta River 1 Oar Slrt Div Div Flat Mixed
69 Italy Aprilis A Oar Irit Div Div Flat Mixed
70 Italy Fuotory 2 US Oar Div Div Flat Mixed
71 Italy "'Bwlinr Alley" I Oar US Corp Div Flat Mixed
71 Italy Molatta River a Oar Brit Div Div Flat Mixed
73 Italy Fioooia oar US Div Div Flat Mixed
74 Italy S. Maria Infamnte US Oar Div Div Rugged Bar&
75 Italy son Martino US Oar Div Div Rusged mora
76 Italy Castellonorato US Oar Div Div Rugged Bare
77 Italy spigno US Oar Div Div Rugged mare
78 Italy Formia US Oar Div Div Ru goed aire
79 Italy Monte Grande (R) US Oar Div Div Rolling Mixed
80 Italy ZttL-Fondi US Oar Div Div Rugged Mixod
81 Italy Tot-raoino Us iGr Div Div Rugged Mixed
82 Italy Moletta River I Brit gar Div Div Flat Mixed
W3 Itely Aailo-Albano Road I Brit Oar Div Div Flat Mixed
84 Italy Arwi•o Breakout US Oar Div Div Flat Mimed
55 Italy Cititerna Us Oar Div Div Flat Mixed
86 Italy Seize US Oar Div Rgt Rolling Mixed
8& Italy Velletri US Oar Div Div Rolling Mixed
88 Italy Cwmpoleone (Station] US Oar Div Div Rolling Mixed
89 Italy Ville Crocatta US Gar Div Div Rolling Mixed
90 Italy Ardee Srit Oar Div Div Rolling Mixed
91 Italy Foass di Compoleone US oar Corp Div Rolling Mixed
91 Italy I.anuvio US Oar Div Div Rolling Mixed
91 Italy Larleno US oar Div Div Rolling Mixed
94 Italy Via AnaLate US oar Div Div Rolling Bare
95 Italy Valmontone US Oap Div Div Rolling Mixed
96 Italy Torto-Tiber Srit Oar Coop Div Flat Mixed
97 Italy 1i ciogio Pass US Oar Div Rgt Rugged Mixed98
99 H.Europe Saint Lo US Oar Div Div Rolling Mixed
100 H.Europe "Oockb'ood' Brit oar Army Corp Rolling Mixed
101 H.Europe "Cobvea' US Oar Corp Corp Rolling Mixed
10t H.Europe Mortain Gar US Corp. Div Rolling Mixed
103 M.Europa Chartres US Oar Div Army Rolling Mixed
104 H.Europe Melti US GOa Div Div Rallinr Mixed
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1,05 N. Europe Seine River US ger Carp Div Rolling Mixed
7h06 N. Europe MOselle-NtzI US Ger Carp Army Rolling Mixed
IO? M.Europe mats us Oar Corp Amy Rolling Mixed
105 M. Europe Arroaourt Oar US Div Ast Rolling Mixed
109 W. lurope Neatwels US Ger Cerp Corp Rolling Mixed
110 W, Europe Sahmidt US Gar Div Corp Rolling Mixed
111 M.Europe Seille-Nied US hr Corp Corp Rolling Mixed
112 N.lurope Chateau SOline US ree Corp Div Rolling Mixed
113 NIurope Norhwane US iar Div Div Rolling Mixed
114 H.IEurope HoehaNge-Fulqueuent US har Corp Core Rolling Mixed
115 M.Europe Saurpgltroff US har Div Div Rolling Mixed
116 1,Europe serre-St. Avoid US hr Corp Corp Rolling Mixed
117 ,EIurope Bevsrndorf I US hOr Div Div Rolling Mixed
114 N4, urope oerendorf A US har Div Div Rolling Mixed
119 WIurope Surbach-turstel US hr Div Div Rolling Mixed
1to .20 urope Durotel-Paereville US har Corp Corp Rolling Mixed
11I 14.Europe Sarre-Union US har Div Div Rolling Mixed
Its 1,Europe Serre-Singling US hr Corp Corp Rolling Mixed
113 M Europe Sineling-lining US gar Div Div Rolling Mixed
124 , Europe Souer River GOr US Div Rgt Rugged Mixed
125 W.Europe Saint Vith Gar US Corp Div Rolling Mixed
16 N, Europa Bastogne Oar US Corp Rat Rolling Mixed
197
115 I.Europe Leningrad-Ifpark* USSR gar Army Army Flat Mixed
129 lEurope Kursk-Oboyan I Oar USSR Corp Army Rolling Mixed
130 l.Iurope Kursk-South (??t] Gar USSR Army AtOp Rolling Mixed
1I1 lEurope Kursk-Oboyan I Oar USSR Corp Army Rolling Mixed
132 lEurope Kurak-Oboyan I Oar USSR Corp Army Rolling Mixed
133 ,U rope Kurak-Prokhorovkm USSR Oar ArOp Corp Rolling Mixed
134 I.Europe Kursk Counterattoak USSR Gar Artp Army Rolling Mixed
135 Ulurope Kursk-Seogorod USSR GOr Army Div Rolling Mimed
136 IUluropa Melitopol USSR Gar ArOp Army Rolling Mixed
137 E1twrope Korown-Sohevkovskiy USSR gar Artp Army rlat Mixed
135 lEurope NiKopol Sridgohoad USSR Oar Div Div Flat Mixed
139 lEurope Sevestopol USSR Oar ArOp Army Rolling Urban
140 IElurope Boerdain River USSR Oar Corp Div Flat swamp
141 I,Europe Lvov-Sardomiers USSR Gar ArOp ArOp Flat Mixed
141 El.urope Brady 1 USSR Oar Corp Rgt Plat Swamp
1413 .Europe Drody & USSR Gar Corp Div Flat Swamp
144 El.urope Vistula Crossing I USSR Oar Corp Div Plat Mixed
14S I.Europe Vistula Crossing t USSR car Corp Corp Flat Mixed
146 IEurope Tergul Frumos USSR Oar Army Div Plat more
147 Elurope Yessy-Kishinmv USSR Oer ArOp ArOp Flat Mixed
146 Elurope Yiltule-Oder USSR gar ArOp ArOp Plot Mixed
149 Elurope loet Prussia USSR Oar ArOp Arop Rolling Mixed
130 IlIurope Cisohanow I USSR Oar Div Div Rolling Sare
Ill Ilurope Cieohanow I USSR Gar Div Div Rolling Bare
1I2 lurope $eelow Heights USSR gar Div Rgt Rugged Mixed
113
154 Paolfic Tarawa-Setto US Jap Div Ret Rolling Mixed
155 Paoific Iwo Jima I US Jep Corp Div Rolling Bare
134 Pacific Iwo Jima-Mt Suribsaohi US Jap Rat Rgt Rugged Nare
157 Paoific Iwo Jima I US Jap Corp Rut Rolling mare
!so Pacific Okinewa Beach I US Jap Div Rgt flat Mixed
159 Pacific Okinawa Outposts US Jap Div Rgt Rugged Mixed
160 Pacific Tomb Hill-Ouki US Jap Div Rai Rugged Mixed
161 Pacifi•i Skyline Ridge US Jap Div Rgt Rugged Mixed
43
162 Pacific Kcohi Ridge-Onega 1 US Jap Div Rgt Rugged Mixed
163 Pacific Koohi Ridg-Onega 3 US Jap Div Rut Rugged Mixed
164 Psoi4io Kochi Ridge-Onsea 3 US Jsp Div Pot Rugged Mixed
165 Pacific Kcehi Counterattaok Jep US Div Rot Rugged Mixed
166 Pacific Kcmhi Ridge 4 US Jap Div Div Rugged Mixed
167 Paeific Shunl Nest X US Jap Div RNt Rugged Mixed
169 Pacific Shunf Counterettack isp US Div Div Rolling Mixed
169 Pocifto Shurl Nost 2 US Jep Div Div Rugged Mixed
170 Pacifi• Shuni Nest 5 US Jep Div Div Rugged Mixed
171 Pailfic Hill-Is I US Jap Dlv Rot Rugged Mixed
127 Pauific Hill-95 a US Jep Div Rgt Rugged Mixed
173 Pacific YseOu Doke US Jap Div Rut Rugged Mixed
174 Paeifie Hills 1II A Its US Jap Div Rot Rugged Mixed
171 Pacific Ck9inw Beach I US Jap Div Rot Rolling Mixed
176 Paeific Shuri Advease US Jep Div Rot Rolling Mixed
177 Peaolflio Kakaxu Tombstone US Jup Div Rut Rolling Mixed
175 Paeifi•i Nishiberu Ridge US Jmp Div Rgt Rolling Mixed
179 Pacifie Mmeed Escarpment US Jsp Div Div Rolling Mixed
160 Paoific Shuri las I US Jap Div Div Rolling Mixed
161 Paoific Shui lasit I US Jsp Div Div Rolling Mixed
163 Paoilio ihuri last I us Jep Div Div Rolling Mixed
1W5 Paoifi• Yuae Doke Approach US Jap Div Div Rolling Mixed
164 Psaolia Yume oake Attaok US Jap Div Div Rolling Mixed
16 Pacific Yuma Doke Capture US iAp Div Rot Rolling Mixed
186
167 Viet Nam Quang Tri NVN OVN4 Corp Div Fist Mixed
166
169 Korea Pusan Perimeter NWor US Corp Div
190 Korea Pusan Breakout US WNor Div Corp
191 Korea Ham River US Chimn Div Army
193 Korea Kunson US Chine Div Army
193 Korea Han River US China Div Army
194 Kt,'sm Butte Line US Chinm Div Army
195 Korea Chan River US China Div Army
196 Korea Kansas Line Chimn US Army Div
197 Korea Pierce Line US China Div Army
198 Koram Iron Triangle Chins US Army Div
199 Korea Bayonette Line US Chine Div Army Rugged
O00
301 H.Rank Jerusalem "Jabussi" Is Jar. Rot Rot Rugged Mixed
302 H.BanK Jerusalem Corridor Is Jar Div Rgt Rolling Bare
203 Golan Mishmar Hayorden I Syr ZI ROt Rgt Flat Mixed
904 Golan Mishmer Heyarden I Syr Is Rot Rot Flat Mixed
305 Colon Hiram Is Syr Div Rgt Rolling Bare
306 Sinai Acre Is Bay Rot Rot Flat Mixed
307 Sinai "Death to Invader" Is Bay RNt Rgt Rolling Bare
306 Sinai 11 Auje "Ayin" Is Bay Div Div Flat Bare
309 Sinai Ageilm-Refah "Ayin" Is Bgy Div Div Flat Bare
I11 Sinai Abu Agelis-Um Katef Is Igy Div Rut Flat Bore
B13 Sinai Sir Rud Selim Is Bgy Rgt Rgt Flat Bare
211 Sinai Rafoh-El Apish Ia lgy Div Div Flat Bure
314 Sinai Gaza-Khan Yunis Is Ely Rut Rgt Flat Urban
315
316 N.Bank Jenin Is Jar Div Rut Rugged Mixed
317 HIank Jerusalem Is Jar Corp Rgt Rugged Mixed
318 W.Bsnk Katibiya Is Jar Rgt Rgt Rugged Mixed
44
219 N.SanK Tillit-Zabobiye Zs Jar Rat Rot Rugged Mixed
320 N.ank Nablus Is Jar Div Div Rugged Mimed
all
223 Jordan Kerems Is Jar Div Div Flat Mixed
334 Sinai RefAh Is tw Div Div Flat Desert
235 Sinai Sir Lahman to Egy L'iv Div Flat Desert
236 Sinai Abu Ageile-Urn Katef Is guy Div Div Flet Mixed
237 Sinai 1l Arish %s Egy Div Div Flat Desert
210 Sinai Jabal Libni Is Bw Div Div Fplt Desert
2t9 Sinai Gaza Strip Is PLO Div Div Flat Mixed
210 Sinai Sir NHssns-Thamedia Is Bay Div Div Flat Desert
511 Sinai Hitla Pass lay Is Div Div Flat Desert
252 Sinai Sir Hama-Stir 6fgafs Is gw Div Div Flat Desert
III Sinal Nmkhl Is KW Div Div FIst Desert
354 Sinai Sir MifgMf% Noy Is Rat Rat Flat Desert
256 Golan Tel Faher-Bsanis Is Syr Rot Rot Rugged mixed
257 Golan Raviyeh Is Syr Rot ftgt Rugged f'ixed
U3S Golan Zmours-Kasa Is Syr Rot Rgt Rugged Mixed
219 Golan Sanise-Moseade Is Syr Rot Rgt Rugged Mixed
940 Golan Kuneitra Is Syr Div Div Rugged Mixed
341 Golan Boutmuya Is Syr Div Div Rugged Mixed
242
241 Sinai Stua Canal-North tgy Is Corp Div Rolling Desert
344 Sinai Suez Buildup-North lay Is Corp Div Rolling Desert
345 Sinai Suez Canal-South lay Is Corp Rot Rolling Desert
346 Sinai Suez Buildup-South toy Is Corp Div Rolling Desert
347 Sinai Kantaro Firdan Is Bay Div Corp Rolling Desert
148 Sinai Suez Attack-North Nw Is Corp Corp Rolling Desert
249 Sinai Suez Attack-South tw Is Corp Copp Rolling Desert
250 Sinai Chinese Farm I Is 1gy Div Corp Rolling Desert
221 Sinai Chinese Form I Is guy Div Corp Rolling Desert
252 Sinai Chinese Form-Mest Is EOy Div Div Rolling Desert
253 Sinai Ismailiae Is gy Div Div Rolling Desert
234 Sinai Jebel Genifae Is Egy Div Corp Rolling Desert
3S. Sinai SIallufm I Is Bgy Div Corp Rollimg Desert
316 Sinai Shallufe 2 In Egy Div Corp Rolling Desert
257 Sinai Suez [Cityl Is Egy Div Corp Rolling Desert
218 Sinai Adebiya Is Egy Div Corp Rolling Desert
319
260 Golan Kumaitre 2 Syr ts Div Rgt Rugged Bgre
261 Golan Ahmsdiyeh Syr Is Div Rot Rugged, Bare
262 Golan Refid Syr Is Div Rgt Rugged Bare
263 Golan Yehuda @I Al Syr Is Div Div Rugged Sare
364 Golan Nsfekh Syr Is Div Rgt Rugged Bore
265 Golan Tel Faris Is Syr Div Div Rugged Bare
366 Golan Hushniyah Is Syr Div Div Rugged Bare
267 Golan Mount Hermonit Syr Is Div Rot Rugged Sara
268 Golan Mount Hermon I Is Syr Rgt Rgt Rugged Bare
269 Golan Tel Shams Is Syr Div Div Rugged Sore
270 Golan Tel Sheer Is Syr Div Div Rugged Sare
271 Golen Tel el Here lrq Is Div Div Rugged Bare
272 Golan Kfar Shams-Tel Antar Is Irq Div Div Rugged Bare
273 Golan Nabo Jar Is Div Rot Rugged Bare
274 Golan Golan Counterattack Syr Is Div Div Rugged Bare
275 Golan Mount Hermon 2 Is Syr Rgt Rgt Rugged Mixed
45
276 Golan Mount Hermen 3 Zs Syr Rot Rst Rugged Mixed
277
276 Lebanon B.kks Valley Is Syr Corp DLv Rolling Desert
279
46
C Row Surprise Defender Sumoess AtKr Atkr Atkr Defdr Defdr Doefdr
Sposture troops. tanks arty treops taris arty
3,
a Atmr Prepared Dfdr 52000 1o 230 100000 70
3
4 Atkr 2439 21a0
5 Atkr Prepared Atkr 48000 716 202 60000 t00 192
6 At~r 17009 t16 12143 236
7 No Hasty Dfdr 11821 at c 16000 t16
a Ho Prepared Tie 189 14 0 189 10
9
)Q No, Fepified Atkr 1410 14 1460 20 t0
11 No Fortified Dfdr 4000 30 40 3010 0 22
12 No Foptifiesc Ofdr 20000 200 100 6000 0 37
13 No Hasty Both 2500 10 4 1228 0 14
14 Atkr Fortified Atkr 57000 498 216 10000 120 131
15 Atkr Fortified Atkr 147000 770 1786 75000 105 B84
16
17 Atkr Hasty Atkr 7000 40 52 12000 0 16
1i
19 Atkt" Hasty Atkr 9000 299q54 15 96
20 Atkr Prepared Atkr 132000 765 370 1S0000 852 520
21 No Prepared Dfdr 1100000 1800 5746 1372200 950 (678
22 No Fortified' Atkr 1060300 667 3440 880000 6s0 2050
23 No Prepared Atkr 54180 539 680 45897 258 370
24
2S No Fortified Dfdr 124000 515 518 120000 450 576
26 Atkr Fortified Atkr 220476 1037 906 100223 593 592
P7 Atkr Fortiflad Atkr 220476 1037 908 105223 593 592
28 No Fortified Atkr 214336 745 906 101128 470
29 No Fortified Atkin 211000 700 906 97000 310
30 Dfdr Hasty ofdr 465 13 0 168 25 3
31 Atkr Hasty Dfdr 10300 103 62 22000 75 124
31 No Fortifled A~kr 24100 94 100 5000 5 34
33
34 No Hasty Atkr 12917 0 136 4250 128 56
3I No Hasty Atkr 12917 0 138 4250 38 46
36 No Hasty Dfdr 12447 106 82 8390 78 90
37 No Hastj Dfdr 14730 89 106 11230 30 146
36 No Hasty Ofdr 15000 108 164 12917 30 146
19 No Hosty Dfdr 14733 96 106 12691 106 112
40 No Delay AtKr 14730 97 152 6995 16 80
41 No Dalay AWr 15576 106 106 6702 19 60
42 No Prepamad Df.r 13300 10 164 16912 96 152
43 No Prepared Atkr 14557 i15 68 8U68 39 41
44 No Delay Atkr 16210 106 104 6435 42 51
45 No Prepared Dfdr 16857 73 160 8000 22 59
46 No Prepared AtKr 21265 51 199 8160 39 45
47 No Delay Atkr 21265 106 89 4435 44 43
48 No Prepared Atkr 18460 95 113 7250 22 59
49 No Delay Dfdr 17034 106 101 3152 B5 51
50 No Prepared Atkr 14600 155 68 8138 40 45
51 No Prepared Atkr 16400 73 112 7239 22 49
52 No Prepared Atkr 17600 51 166 8126 39 45
53 No Prepared Ofdr 14000 156 68 6088 39 45
47
54 No Prepared Atkr 16870 106 92 6321 30 41
55 No Fortified Dfdr 19513 45 160 4730 58 64
56 No Fortified qfdr 16600 106 110 6566 54 50
57 No Fortified Dfdr 17404 106 110 6566 54 so
56 No Hasty Atkr 7942 i.0 41 5200 0 112
59 No Fortified Tie 16350 106 106 7942 41 53
60 No Fortified Dfdr 17765 51 .30 7YO 12 37
61 No Fortified Atkr 20744 0 140 3208 12 34
62 No Fortified Atkr 5551 0 152 9263 12 34
63 AtKr Hasty Atkr 19350 71 160 6750 46 66
64 'Mo Hasty Ofdr 15317 92 130 17976 71 241
65 No Prepared AtKr 260*9 107. M2 9834 35 122
66 No Prepared Atkr 177-6' 71 2.#C 15098 92 123
67 No Prepared Dfdr 26490 107 2t1 4515 139 at
68 No Prepared Tie 7418 27 as 5000 0 ?6
69 No Prepared Atkr ti51s 11 22is 17740 100 226
70 No Fortified Dfdr 13400 70 155 7077 26 102
71 Atkr Fortified Ofdr 41974 201 317 20496 75 E20
72 Atkr Fortified Atkr R1478 24 167 19761 59 185
73 No Fortified Dfdr 15367 45 164 19613 106 187
74 No Fortified Atkr 18702 249 160 9950 34 123
75 No Fortified Atkr 17970 107 160 6141 21 76
76 No Fortified Atkr 16455 124 1.4 7500 21 71
77 No Delay Atkr 16306 249 166 8213 40 126
78 No Daley AtKr 3190 g25 159 7627 30 s8
79 No Hasty Atkr 13095 130 142 4563 23 40
80 No Delay Atkr 17912 104 196 6650 26 40
81 No Hasty AtKr 16230 131 148 6653 26 40
82 No Fortified Tie 17345 35 100 12569 0 92
83 No Fortified Tie 17343 36 100 11343 14 96
84 Atkr Fortified Atkr 22374 424 15Z 12815 89 107
65 AtKr Fortified Atkr 19971 106 201 11990 49 8a
86 No Nithdraw Athr 17925 110 136 6957 32 86
87 ODdr Fortified Dfdr 20663 462 92 12327 65 64
8U No Fortified Tie 19047 10, 97 10593 19 106
89 No Fortified Dfdr 18000 102 93 13'15 71 117
90 No Fortified Atkr 15557 D5 104 7659 0 64
91 No Fortified Dfdr 29711 281 146 15001 100 117
92 No Fortified O4dr 17300 0 94 6108 46 61
93 No Prepared Atke 22641 106 115 13012 30 112
94 No Fortified Tie 23604 1%6 121 19255 35 202
9s io Hasty AtKr 26607 126 144 10111 31 110
96 No Fortified AtKr 38011 71 200 1085S 0 125
97 No Fortified Atkr 15721 70 145 £700 0 29
95
99 No Fortified Atkr 16228 107 120 7M00 23 64
100 A'kr Fortified Dfdr 7623.3 1369 720 57500 528 292
101 No Fortified Atkr 126000 650 792 30700 62 318
102 Atkr Hasty Dfdr 25500 120 218 27673 340 192
103 No Hasty Tie 15646 317 146 6325 1s 76
104 No Prepared Atkr 17232 318 146 6000 16 32
105 No Prepared Atkr 40619 472 29f 15000 38 s0
106 No Delay Tie 59631 565 520 41500 160 248
107 No Fortified Dfdr 60794 472 296 39580 a8 248
108 No Hasty Dfdr 7500 12. 12 4800 122 40
109 No Fortified Atkr 32283 312 234 19632 63 116
110 No Fortified Ofdr 20493 91 177 20250 66 114
48
II11 No Fort if ied Atkr 99b603 764 AS3 U55" 71 99
III No Fortified Atkr 435867 126 259 11165 to 1it
11.3 No Prepered Atkr 25681 202 142 79b5 16 106
114 No Fortified AtKr 91595 524 515 C6382 63 169
1.13 No Prepared A+kr 10346 115 168 6519 14' 61
*116 N~o Prepared Atkr 88941 642 519 52596 66 207
117 No Hasty Atkr* 7911 106 11 23~66 so 64
.116 No Prepared Atkr 15672 e11 56 6299 56 67
129 No. prepared Atkr 16232 111 104 6713 43 61
110' ", prepared Tie 90076 624 541 50712 75 456
121, Po prepared Atkr 19773 137 116 6044 IS 150
122 No Liamlay Atkr 69977 624 565 £1501 42 195
125 No FortifieeA Tie 15214 a11 104 5044 16 99
11Itf Atkr Hasty AtKr 10000 4 66 6634 40 60
121 W~. Meaty Tie 67000 251 94 19996 152 l0g
126 No Hasty 0fdr 56676 559 515 4649 152 16
127
1I6 No Fortified Atkr' 120000 lit 1It7$ 50000 20 1ot
U29 Ne- Fortified Atkr 62000 520 410 45000 55 1160
130 N4o Prepared Atkr 140000 868 470 75000 151 2115
131 No Prepared Atkr 60000 t60 375 149000 450 1600
1.32 No PrepAred Dfdr 16000 l05 325 129000 510 1490
2.31 No Healty Atkr 76000 650 1360 62300 505 419
1.34 Noý Prepared AtKr 960600 2295 1.220 160000 600 1600
135 No Fortified Atkr 70000 291 106" 15000 s0 171
156 No Fortified AtKr 124714 778 5450 210000 500 1500
137 No Priopered Atkr 254950 451 2650 64100 229 626
1UP No Fort ' tied Atkr 25100 6 t01 6230 0 44
Wi NO Forti-fied Atkr 597L00 490 3690 72000 50 1050
140 No Hasty Atkr 16100 196 I1s 6500 15 $2
141 Not Prepared Atkr 1200000 1979 IlbI 900000 900 4400
142 No Praeared AtKr 390'00 14 750 3300 0 44
*145 No P.pm vesd I Atkr 36500 s5 71.6 13900 105 105
144~ No Prepared AtKr 12700 0 20; 5100 12 76
145 No Prepared Pfdr 17050 34 306 6400 24 156
146 No Mobile 040:, 35170 410 15725 160
2.47 No Prepared Atko' 1250000 1426 10469 £00000 400 5510
146 No Prepared Atkr 2100000 4130 17990 560000 1100 3050
149 No Fortified Atkr 1420000 1055 15140 760000 700 5,140
150 No 'ortif led both 10800 73 420 3100 12 76
151 110 Fortifle~d Atkr tells 190 414 5900 32 64
12.5 No Fortified Atkr 15600 76 153 3710 5 26
153
154 No FurtiEfted Atkr 9000 46 976 4656 14 53
1BM No For~ilfW Atkr 33411 144 474 16500 40 59
2.56 NO Fortified Atkr 5300 13 550 1600 0 50
2.57 No Fortified Atkr 32000 144 eo0 2665 40 120
is$6 NO Daeay Atkr 22688 134 95 2400 0
1b9 NO Fortified Atkr 16595 134 175 2900 0 It
160 No Fortified Atkr 16111 151 121 4731 0 it
161 No Fortified Atkr 16291 125 221 2600 0 38
1.69 No Fortified Dfdr 14594 126 103 5009 0 40
1.65 No Fortified Dfdr 15966 123 226 4500 0 40
164 No Fortified 0fdr 15766 126 329 4050 0 40
165 No Hasty Dfdr 6650 0 60 15350 140 196
2.b6 No Fortified Atkr 15109 140 209 5140 0 30
167 Akkr Prepbard IAtkr 16043 0 s0 3336 0 2
49
168 AtKr, Hasty Ofdr 4000 0 a 16777 0 157
169 No Fortified CCdr 15IWO 0 171 3000 0 24
170 No Fortified Atki, logo# 79 150 2600 0 3
171 N. Fortified Tie 16091 122 129 5500 0 12
179 ' No Fortified AtKr 16002 122 1I0 1500 0 it
173 No Fortified Atkr Its7 40 i3 2500 
0 6
174 No Fov4 -Pied Atkr 11805 109 141 2000 0 6
175 Nn DeWay Atkr 19085 13U 95 to00 0 0
176 No Fortitfed AtKr 13ei 74 174 2900 0 It
177 No Fortified Dfdr 21347 0 146 lo00 0 It
i75 No Fortl+|ed AtKr 17163 100 315 3000 0 14
179 4o Fortified Atkr 15095 97 200 3900 0 36
10 NO Fortified T1e 19714 121 17 53t4 0 34
151 No Foriiflee Tie 20973 119 I10 4757 0 34
152 No FortL+isa Atkr 19658 140 153 42&7 0 34
151 No -Prepared Atkr 16777 111 177 4000 0 11
184 No Prepared Tie 18660 117 172 4250 0 11
165 No Prepared AtKr 19047 111 306 32O5 0 1
186
167 No Prepared Akr 10000 100 17000 76
166
169 No Heuty Ofdr 11000 0 72 11200 g15 72
190 No Delay A*kr 16600 too 70 10100 0 72
191 No Delay AtKr 16400 too 70 9000 0 26
192 No Delay Atkr, 16200 f15 72 7100 0 a3
195 No Prepared AtIvr 21500 215 162 27000 0 745
194 No Hasty AtKr 29000 c15 71 30200 0 646
195 No Hasty Akr* A6000 gi5 72 12500 0 128
116 No Delay 10700 0 240 26900 U15 7e
197 No Hoaty Atkr 27900 15 72 51o00 0 a .03
195 No Hasty Ofdr 57000 0 192 33100 116 a5
149 No Prepared A*kr 13700 115 72 15500 0 72
t00
201 No Preparad Tie 3000 1i a 3600 a 4
202 No Prepared 4500 57 14 200 40 4
t03 No Piasrod Athr 4000 100 2 2500 0 16
204 No Hasty Dfdr 3000 60 6 2700 2s 16
205 No Prepared 6000 60 51 60oo 60 24
206 No Prspmred Atkr 2500 0 2 5000 0 6
207 No Prepared Atkr 2500 35 a 3000 40 24
208 No Prepared Atkr 6000 7m 14 401)0 90 15
209 No Prepared Atkr 4000 so 16 3000 67 11
210
211 No Fortified Dfdr 4700 72 27 4000 35 32
212 No Fortified Atkr 34c6 40 5 5300 45 34
.13 No Fortified Atkr 10000 106 52 10050 105 130
214 No Prepared Atkr 4000 25 1i 6400 a 44
216 Atkr Prepared Atkr 10900 100 36 6160 40 to
217 Atkr Fortified Atkr 37653 91 7n 15400 40 36
G6 No Hasty Atkr 19800 140 48 9900 120 24
219 No Hasty Attr 5350 t0 34 5450 60 24
220 No Hasty A-'%r 10700 10 46 5640 64 24
222 No Prepared Tie 11940 128 67 16166 60 91
223
224 Mtkr Prepared Atkr 19520 240 84 19520 197 68
so
225 No Hasty AtKr 10450 160 48 10050 180 48
226 Atkr Fortified Atkr 19280 12o 72 18450 114 126
227 No Prepared Atkr 6350 90 48 12750 78 36
228 No Prepared Tie 10800 184 48 3000 60 48
229 No Prepared AtMr 12150 100 72 17450 134 114
230 No Prepared AtKr 6700 146 48 3000 40 24
231 No Hasty 04dr M2000 224 114 7250 90 48
252 No Delay Atkr 10200 220 72 13500 172 48
833 Atkr Hasty Atkr 18780 120 72 18450 114 72
134 No Hasty Dfdr 3100 60 3600 70 0
235
236 No Fortified Atkr 5375 10 24 8160 75 70
237 No Fortified AtKr 1350 90 24 4350 50 76
236 No Fortified Mtkr 1850 90 24 8160 75 a2
239 No Prepared Atkr 11400 184 48 9060 175 72
240 No Prepared Atkr 16500 409 72 19300 505 132
241 No Prepared Atkr 17550 224 72 16767 366 108
242
243 AtKr Prepared Atkr 29490 67 1223 4455 67 40
244 No Hasty Atkr 63910 464 639 14000 192 40
241 Atkr Prepared AtKr 22850 71 971 3020 5e 28
246 No Hasty Atkr 41160 310 555 10960 148 24
247 No Hasty Dfdr 25650 530 44 67440 516 639
U48 No Hasty Dfdr 81160 1002 56s 43400 714 144
249 No Hasty Dfdr 57960 709 447 38600 348 96
210 Atkr Hasty AAKr £2790 544 96 30970 369 322
251 No Hasty Atkr 28900 444 72 16840 419 347
252 No Hasty Atkr 19600 232 72 18180 293 119
253 No Hasty Ofdr 17000 232 72 23860 246 72
214 No Hasty AtKr 16200 318 48 35623 454 10
g5s No Hasty Atkr 16200 316 72 25600 445 160
256 No Withdrew Atkr 11700 126 48 22170 259 139
257 No Hasty 01dr 14681 225 60 22570 259 139
258 No Fortified Atkr 10900 164 36 14620 199 37
259
260 Atkr Prepared Tie 3.7750 75 115 3650 s0 12
261 Atkr Fortified Ofdr 22710 147 111 5745 78 16
262 Atkr Fortified AAkr 19525 147 129 4958 75 24
263 Atkr Hasty ofdr 21984 189 129 6300 106 136
264 Atkr Hasty Ofdr 12500 318 71 6946 110 36
260 No Hasty Atkr 17833 249 60 23750 253 150
266 No Hasty Atkr 12735 219 60 14683 170 90
267 No Prepared Ofdr 31610 182 155 5395 38 24
268 No Fortified Dfdr 2692 9 12 1583 1 24
269 NO Fortified AAKr 16100 270 60 19400 529 110
270 No Prepared AAKr 14700 3Il 60 11500 387 130
271 Dfdr Hasty Dfdr 12500 318 71 14300 316 60
272 Atkr Hasty Aikr 11000 212 40 12000 269 70
273 No Prepared O1dr 11500 269 48 11000 212 48
274 No Prepared D4dr 31750 566 198 16100 270 60
275 No Fortified Ofdr 5700 0 12 4750 0 27
276 NO Fortified Atkr 11400 0 24 4750 0 27
277
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